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AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP1. Introduction
1.1 When this Committee met in January
2009 in Cape Town, it rightly stressed the
need to monitor the impact of the econo-
mic crisis which is still unfolding. Evidence
available now points to a deteriorating
economic outlook on the continent as
trade declines and key sectors such as
mining, manufacturing and tourism are hit
by plummeting commodity prices and a
continuous decline in global demand.
1.2 The latest key features of the crisis
since the last meeting include :
• A slowdown in the downward trend of
commodity prices. For example,
a barrel of crude oil was trading at USD
45 at the end of February 2009.
• A continued fall of most African stock
markets and a depreciation of most
currencies.
• Rising unemployment and activity
shutdowns. The collapse of commodity
prices has forced a number of interna-
tional mining companies to close. The
worst case may be in the Democratic
Republic of Congo where more than
350,000 jobs are estimated to have
been lost in the Katanga Province.
• Worsening of fiscal and current account
balances of most African countries.
1.3 African governments are doing their
best to mitigate the impact of the crisis,
especially its effect on the poor. However,
since the last meeting, the leeway has
continued to shrink. Budget deficits have
widened and foreign exchange reserves
contracted. Public spending on infrastruc-
ture and basic needs is increasingly
threatened, with dire consequences on
the poor. While our development partners
have committed to meeting their aid
pledges, and some are intervening in
African countries both through emergency
grants and to prevent a worsening of the
impact, we are concerned that traditional
mechanisms will delay disbursements
with detrimental consequences on the
implementation of rescue and recovery
initiatives. It is therefore critical to increa-
se both speed and flexibility in develop-
ment assistance processes.
1.4 This note is a brief update on the
impact of the crisis on Africa and on grow-
th outlook in the medium term (Section 2).
It highlights key issues that deserve spe-
cial attention as the continent attempts to
weather the storm in view of the G20
summit (Section 3). Section 4 concludes
on the role of the African Development
Bank.
2. Update on the Outlook
Economic Prospects
2.1 In light of this fast evolving context,
all projections for economic indicators for
1Africa were reviewed since the first C-10
meeting. Africa is now expected to grow at
a rate of 2.8 percent in 2009, down from
5.7 percent in 2008 and 6.1 percent in
2007 (Table 1 and Figure 1). In 2009,
growth rates for oil-exporting and non-oil-
exporting countries are expected to fall by
4.2 and 1.3 percentage points, respective-
ly. Macro-economic balances have also
deteriorated. First, from an overall current
account surplus of 3.5 percent of GDP in
2008, the continent will face a 3.8 percent
deficit in 2009 (Table 2). Second, Africa
will move from a budgetary surplus,
accounting for 2.3 percent of GDP in 2008
to a 5.4 percent deficit in 2009. In particu-
lar, budgetary deficit by oil exporters are
forecasted to reach 7.7 percent of GDP in
2009, down from a surplus of 5.1 percent
in 2008 (Table 3). Lower economic activity,
oil and food prices are expected to contri-
bute to lower inflation in 2009 (Table 4).
2.2 Foreign exchange reserves have
continued to shrink over the period.
Indeed, the decline in export-oriented acti-
vities (mining, tourism, textile, and manu-
facturing sectors) due to falling prices and
demand, have led to losses in export
revenues. Today, some countries have
gone from months of import cover to just
a few weeks.
Vulnerability
2.3 In low-income countries and fragi-
le states, the ability of governments to
respond to the crisis is severely constrai-
ned by the erosion of their fiscal space as
revenues fall. In these vulnerable coun-
tries (Table 5), development achieve-
ments are now threatened by potential
decreases in government expenditures (in
social services in particular) and unsustai-
nable macroeconomic imbalances. This
situation is especially acute in countries
which have been severely hit by the food
and oil crisis. Ultimately, some countries
could default on their debt payments
which would, in turn, jeopardize their
access to external financing.
2.4 In better-off countries, the economic
downturn could be mitigated by imple-
menting policies to boost demand.
However, it is now acknowledged that,
even in those countries, the fiscal space
remains at risk should the crisis deepen
and/or last longer. It is therefore time to
seriously consider establishing well desi-
gned social safety nets with clear targets
and financing mechanisms. They should
be designed for easy scaling up in times
of crisis to respond to expanding needs.
3. G20 and MDBs
Coordination
3.1 An international coordination policy is
critical. The G20 can support Africa’s
efforts in mitigating the crisis through four
channels. First, the G20 can galvanize
2donor commitments to increase official
development assistance to Africa.
Second, the G20 can raise awareness of
the detrimental impacts of trade protectio-
nism and severe constraints on credit
access. In particular, the G20 should
encourage members to avoid any measu-
re that inadvertently induces a bias
against lending and investing in African
countries. Third, the G20 can call for an
increase in development resources alloca-
ted to Africa, notably through its regional
development banks. Finally, the G20 can
provide strong support towards the
conclusion of the Doha Development
Round and an advancement of the Aid for
Trade agenda.
3.2 As far as Multilateral Development
Banks (MDBs) are concerned; they can
support African governments in reforming
and building capacity through devising
innovative instruments. This will require
scaling up resources for MDBs to allow
them to meet increased demand from
Regional Member Countries.
Financial Regulation, Supervision, and
Surveillance
3.3 Since the beginning of 2009, the
governance and regulation of financial
institutions and markets have been in the
spotlights. Within the current financial sys-
tem framework, some transactions (e.g.,
off-balance sheet operations) are not sub-
ject to scrutiny by regulators. These off-
balance sheet operations can be a source
of systemic risk and should be subject to
appropriate regulation.
Trade
3.4 Aid-for-Trade is becoming critically
important as poor infrastructure is impo-
sing a heavy burden on Africa’s ability to
trade, and makes African trade uncompe-
titive in global markets. A long-term strate-
gy to promote trade must therefore
address supply bottlenecks and Africa’s
connectivity to global markets. Such a
strategy needs to involve long-term assis-
tance programmes, especially, predictable
aid flows which can be fed into budgeting
processes.
3.5 As banks in developed countries
have cut lines of credit to African banks
and companies, a severe shortage of cre-
dit to finance trade has arisen. The global
shortfall of trade credit is currently estima-
ted at around US$ 25 billion. Efforts to
inject liquidity in financial institutions in
developed countries have not yet resol-
ved this shortage. Initiatives at global and
regional levels to facilitate access to trade
finance are therefore urgently needed.
3.6 Since January 2009, governments
have implemented various interventions to
preserve jobs and livelihoods that could
undermine global trade. Creeping protec-
3tionism particularly threatens some sec-
tors, including agriculture, which is the
mainstay of many African economies.
However, glaring trade protectionist mea-
sures still remain limited, as advised
during the G20 November 2008 Summit.
The challenge in 2009 is for developed
and emerging economies to fulfil their pro-
mises of trade liberalization. In this
regard, the G20 can promote (i) the resto-
ration of access to financing for African
countries; and (ii) the reduction of the
continent’s exposure to systemic risk,
especially in relation to increased cross-
border banking.
3.7 African countries need to design
short-term and long-term strategies that
boost trade, and domestic resource mobi-
lization, to build more resilience to
shocks. On the trade front, countries need
to pursue domestic trade policy reforms
that support international rules setting
(simplification, harmonization and stan-
dardization of rules, procedures and pro-
cesses), unlocking trade opportunities in
the regional agenda, and increasing their
voice and participation in the Doha
Development Round.
4. The Role of the Bank and the
Need to Scale up Resources
4.1 The African Development Bank is
facing the challenge of meeting rising
demand for assistance from its Regional
Member Countries (RMCs) since the cri-
sis resulted in a deteriorating credit envi-
ronment marked by a downgrade of coun-
terparties and negative watch listing of
some borrowers. While the Bank’s finan-
cial capacity is currently strong and can
support projected lending in line with its
Medium Term Strategy(MTS) up to 2012,
it will be severely strained by rising
demand beyond the MTS projections., It
is, therefore, important that measures be
taken in a timely manner to provide addi-
tional capacity to ensure sustainable,
long-term assistance to its RMCs.
4.2 As a response to the crisis, the Bank
is proposing several initiatives to provide
funding to its regional member states,
notably through the Emergency Liquidity
Facility (ELF), the Trade Financing Facility
(TFF) and accelerated transfers to ADF
countries. The USD 1.5 billion ELF will
provide financial support to AfDB eligible
countries and non-sovereign operations in
member countries that are suffering from
lack of liquidity due to the global financial
crisis. The USD 1 billion Trade Finance
Initiative (TFI) will allow African commer-
cial banks and Development Finance
Institutions (DFI) to use AfDB resources to
support trade finance operations. The
Accelerated Resource Transfer to ADF
Countries will support the Bank’s low-
income concessional borrowers through
an accelerated use of currently available
4concessional resources. In addition, bud-
get support and balance of payments sup-
port are needed as short-term instruments
in addressing resource constraints on
African Countries. Although such initia-
tives are useful in mitigating negative
shocks, more resources and instruments
will be needed to meet the needs of
African countries. These can also comple-
ment more structural measures to increa-
se the Bank’s resource pool through the
general capital increase.
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5. Questions for consideration
1. Should fiscal targets used in the context of lending/assistance agreements be revised
upward in the short term to allow countries to implement counter-cyclical demand stimu-
lus? By how much should the targets be adjusted and for how long?
2. Are any countries facing any risk of insolvency vis-à-vis their external debt due to
declines in export revenues and foreign exchange reserves?
3. What measures can be used to assist countries that face this situation to achieve fis-
cal stability in the short run while preserving credibility vis-à-vis international markets?
4. What are the country-specific needs for crisis response in terms of external financing?
This is important to allow donors to plan their aid budgets and make a case for scaling




Table 1: Africa’s Real GDP Growth (%)
Table 2: Africa’s External Current Account, including grants (% GDP)
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Figure 1: Africa: Real GDP Growth
Figure 2: Africa: Fiscal Balance as % of GDP8
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Source: African Economic Outlook 2009 (preliminary estimates), AfDB, 2009
Note: (e) denotes an estimate and (p) a projection
Table 2: Africa’s External Current Account, including grants (% GDP)9
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Source: African Economic Outlook 2009 (preliminary estimates), AfDB, 2009
Note: (e) denotes an estimate and (p) a projection
Table 4: Africa’s Consumer Prices (Inflation in %)10
Table 5: Exposure to Economic Crisis – Vulnerability
Source: Calculations based on the AfDB Socio Economic database
Note: Vulnerability is assessed based on:
(1) macroeconomic balances and fiscal space (current account deficit/surplus and fiscal deficit/surplus), and
(2) poverty levels at $1/day.
Cut off points are:
• Current account balance: x<-7.7%, -7.7%<x<-4%, -4%<x<-2%, -2%<x<0%, x>0%;
• Budget balance: x<- 3%, -3%<x<-2%, -2%<x<0%, x>0%;
• Poverty: x>50%; 20%<x<50%; x<20%
Level of vulnerability Countries
Very high
high poverty and weak macro balances/ fiscal
space
High
High poverty and moderately weak macro
balances/fiscal space
Moderate:
moderately weak balances and low or moderate
poverty
Low
Low poverty, positive macro balances
Very low:
sound macro balances, very low poverty
Burundi, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger,
Senegal, Sudan, Togo
Angola, Central Africa Republic, Congo Dem Rep,
Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe,
Sierra Leone, Zambia
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guniea Bissau, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Sychelles, Tanzania, Zimbabwe
Tunisia, Morocco, Uganda, Cameroon, Swaziland,
Equatorial Guinea
Algeria, Botswana, Gabon, Lybia, Namibia11
Appendix 2: Figures
Figure 1: Africa: Real GDP Growth
Figure 2: Africa: Fiscal Balance as % of GDP
Source: African Economic Outlook 2009 (preliminary estimates), AfDB, 2009
e: estimates and p: projection
Source: African Economic Outlook 2009 (preliminary estimates), AfDB, 2009
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